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CALIBRATING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A BRIEF HISTORY OF LAW
According to Greek mythology, the earth and sky conceived Themis (the Titaness
of divine justice and law). Thereafter, Themis became the second wife of Zeus and gave
birth to Dike (the goddess of moral order and fair judgment). Dike was thought to be the
means to justice—of fair judgments and rights established by custom and law—whereas
Themis was divine justice—justice itself.1 In tribute to the myths, Dike is often depicted
as holding the scales of justice, the scales based on equal arm beam balances.

Picture 01: Within this archaic mechanism, two pans hang from a beam at points equidistant from the
fulcrum (point of support). Objects were weighed by equalizing the weight with standard weights added
together. At that moment, equilibrium was reached.

Together, as mother and daughter, the two divine conceptions personified justice in the
realms of both humans and gods, weighing the actions of humans in terms of justice.
These two conceptions of justice ruled the archaic period of Ancient Greece’s
understanding of law in a way incomprehensible to modern man, for justice was
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interwoven into every sphere of life. In Ancient Greece, the fulfillment of one’s soul,
leading one to a virtuous life, was what every man strived for in existence.
Within the late archaic period of Ancient Greece, laws transformed into thesmoi:
they were now structured and established as written words, giving permanence and
validity to parts of community life reducible to written regulations.2 At this time, dikē’,
arising from themis, became incorporated into the beginnings of a regulatory structure
that acted to govern aspects of a community. Though laws were now malleable into text,
the lofty conception of justice was still present within them. For example, Lycurgus (the
individual who is historically attributed with composing the first written laws) is said to
have documented the professions of an oracle from Delphi.3 The judicial system within
Ancient Greece utilized judges in the same sense as the modern day system does. At this
time, however, judges were respected and seen as having the presence of the divine
within them; individuals believed “the administration of justice rests with persons called
dikaspoloi (‘handlers of dikē’) whom Zeus has entrusted with the guardianship of the
themistes.4” The godly conceptions of justice from Ancient Greece were almost seen as a
gift to humans for their use in ordering their societies, analogous to Prometheus’ gift of
fire to humankind.
It was not until the classical period of Ancient Greece that written laws, thesmoi,
became nomoi, written statutes influenced by and imparted to the political and social
customs. Much like the term “norm” in the modern culture, nomos is described as
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consisting of those beliefs widely held but valid only to the extent to which they are
believed, not scrutinized.5 Through precedence, these actions became so entangled in
society that they were thought of as its framework; hence, there were no moral principals
or even rationale to examine. As a result of the adherence to nomoi, laws arising within
this period were more surface level, less purposeful, and more difficult to rationalize. The
movement away from the overarching principles within themis became more evident in
that nomos arose from the “cohesion from the fact that it is, or ought to be, generally
regarded as valid and binding by the members of the group of which it prevails.6”
Within the classical period of Anicent Greece, it was as if dikē became corrupted by
the notions found within nomoi. The fulcrum on the scale of justice, ultimately holding
the pans equidistantly apart, was beginning to crumble as the emphasis on themis was
lessened. Without this fulcrum keeping the pans equidistantly apart, the subsequent
weights of items cannot accurately be determined. The actions of humans within this
period could not be accurately examined through the lens of law without themis
balancing the methodology of law. Hence, laws within this period became a product of a
culture, not the means to justice and harmony within a culture. Since laws became the
unscrutinized products of the culture, the end to which they served was left to the
determination of those with the power to influence culture.
This detachment from themis and adherence to nomoi seen in the Classical Period of
Ancient Greece influenced Roman law, as evidenced through the Roman Era’s focus on
material and public welfare instead of the conceptions of law. At this time, laws focused
on contracts, property, easements, corporations, partnerships, and injuries—many
5
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concepts evident in the Western legal system today.7 It is important to note that the focus
on public welfare was only to a superficial level: for example, “there was no theory that it
was the duty of the state to furnish social security or to establish a system of socialized
medicine…the state did not provide education for children.8” Furthermore, though the
law was focused to an extent on human rights and protecting the freedom of men, such
was validated under unarticulated Hobbesian notions that humans cannot live peacefully
together under natural law. The justification of law became a self-defense, a caveat of
humans living with one another, instead of something that flourishes from the human
existence. It was in this mistrust of human nature that Roman law was created by the
state, and, in accordance with the Christian emphasis, it was said to be “the powers that
are ordained of God,” that were needed to mitigate and “protect good men from the
wicked.9”
Even though the conception of the purpose of law changed within these times,
judges acting as overseers of law within the judicial system were still seen and revered as
the only individuals who “should always be aware of their high duty; they should be
impartial, never acting as judges in matters that concerned their own interests, always
following the rules of reason and equity rather than the letter of law.10” Though the
backdrop upon which law was set in the Roman Era differed from the Ancient Greeks,
the role of Roman judges was similar to the dikaspoloi, carrying the notions of dikē’ with
them, with an emphasis on reason and equity instead of the morality quality in themis.
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The Roman perspective on law has largely remained prevalent in the Western world,
with the separation of church and state further separating the use of morality within
judgments of law (though many laws still followed today were influenced by this
perspective). In modern times, the perspective and studies in law largely shifted to
isolated parts of dikē’, to the nature of law within the legal system itself, instead of within
a broader context, and how one should interpret written law. Philosophers studying law
began to interpret law as a relationship between commands, sanctions and duties within
society.
An English Jurist named John Austin in the 1930’s posited the Hobbesian notions that
law arises from the sovereign of society and that the sovereign’s law was almost nondebatable: “The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether it
be or not be is one inquiry; whether it be or not be conformable to an assumed standard is
a different inquiry.11” Law is then seen as something severed from morality, from themis,
and only explainable to the end (the sovereign, group in power, or fundamental
principles) to which the law ultimately serves. Hence, the scales of justice became so torn
apart that the scale that was used to measure one side against the other vanished. The
only part left within the scale of justice was the pan for the object to be weighed—which
was now not under the discretion of themis at all, but under a specific portion of dikē’. It
could only weigh itself against itself.
The origin of prior laws was of no concern to philosophers during this period – laws
were simply valid from the strength of their precedence in jurisprudence. It became a
self-sufficient and self-explaining system whose fault and existence was weighed against
11
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itself, with coercion and duty propagating such. The system of law defended itself
through fear of punishment and through the notions that it is one’s duty to follow laws to
maintain social order. Thus, a heightened focus on the interpretation of law, on the text of
such, reasonably arose. For, if the existence and purpose of law was something to take for
granted, the only debatable ground within law is the text composing such—here the types
of judicial interpretation of original intent, literalism, and doctrinal approach arose.12
The perspective that arose during the modern age in opposition to the more textual
based version of law cried to revive the concept of morality—of themis—within law.
Theorists took the previous principles arising from the ages and recognized that law is
largely a social phenomenon, that, without the populous’ internal adherence to the
principles of such, diminishes the aim of law to keep society under control.13 They
recognized that the scales of justice cannot perform its duty without a fulcrum—a
principle—to hold the pans in which objects are weighted. In using such rational as a
guise to focus on the existence of morality in law, theorists began postulating the “certain
conditions which a legal system must fulfill if it is to be minimally efficient in achieving
the orderly regulation of social life.14” When such was attempted, it became understood
that there was an “internal morality of law” (coined by Lon Fuller)—an overarching
principle—which must be connected with minimal notions of justice to determine the
principal conditions for a legal system.
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In this perspective, law became a means with a purpose for a greater end. The
relationship between dikē’ and themis in constructing the scales of justice emerged once
more. Law was not viewed as merely text and expensive rhetoric in courtrooms – it
became purposeful for the betterment and alignment of society with justice and morals.
For example, Myers McDougal posits that law is a means to social change –laden with
justice and morality – to an end supported by morality and justice.16 Just as the opposing
perspective within modern times coined judicial perspectives of interpretations, this type
of perspective did as well. One such perspective highlighted by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes was to interpret the “findings of a case, and [have] the further creative role in
choosing between competing rules and principles for application.17” Judicial decisions
were not meant to arise from just legal text but also from the moral and social contexts of
society. Several other types of interpretations that arose from this train of thought were
balancing competing interests (or eventualities) and a structuralist point of view that
magnified decisions to the context of society.18
As evidenced, the perspective of law has oscillated drastically to and from morality
and justice. The relationship of dikē’ and themis that characterizing the beginning of law,
slowly dissipated into the pieces of the scales of justice, hyper-focusing on these parts of
dikē’. Now, it appears that the “contemporary studies of legal reasoning hold…some
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promise of bridging the ancient division between positivist and natural law traditions19” –
this point in history is pivotal to determining whether or not morality and justice can be
incorporated back into the law. The mere cold and calculated text of the law has no
sensitivity for the human condition when compared to what objective, moral-laden
judicial insight can do. It is within analyzing current judicial thought, and determining the
qualities of such that are beneficial to heightening the perspectives of justice and
morality, that we may be able to rejuvenate our legal system to be a semblance of what its
main purpose was – to both better individual and society. Hence, judicial decisions to a
hypothetical fact pattern are analyzed to see what trends of thought are prevalent, and
what implications this may have on society.
THE BASIS
The hypothetical case utilized in this research is based on two recent Illinois
Appellate Court decisions that display dichotomy in legal perspective seen in modern-day
thought.
People v. McDaniel, 2012 IL App (5th) 100575
The Defendant entered a Wal-Mart store wearing sunglasses, a heavy coat, and a
ski cap, though it was not very cold outside.20 This raised the suspicion of the store’s loss
prevention agent, who then followed the Defendant through the store, while also
informing the store’s video surveillance system to monitor him. The agent then witnessed
the Defendant pick up three fishing reels, valued at $181.00, and walk out of the store.21
The video surveillance shows the Defendant was in the store for six minutes. The
19
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Defendant was originally convicted of the more serious crime of burglary instead of the
less severe crime of retail theft. However, on appeal, the McDaniel court determined
through analysis that the Defendant ultimately “did not ‘remain within’ in order to
commit a theft.22 He entered with authority and did not exceed the physical scope of his
authority left immediately after stealing the fishing reels. Defendant was properly
convicted of that theft.23” The court duly noted that the difference in penalties was severe
enough to negatively reshape public policy.24
People v. Bradford, 2014 IL App (4th) 130288
An asset-protection associate was watching the Defendant as he walked into a
Wal-Mart store, grabbed two DVDs from the display, and performed a “no receipt
return,” for which he received a gift card in the amount of the DVD’s returned.25 The
Defendant then produced a Wal-Mart plastic bag from his person and placed the shoes he
selected off the aisle into the bag.26 The Defendant then paid for an unknown male’s
items, did not offer to pay for any of his concealed items, and left the store.27 He was then
charged and convicted with burglary. On appeal, the Bradford court rationalized the
Defendant’s conviction, noting that a “defendant remaining within a building open to the
public is ‘without authority’ if it is accompanied by an intent to steal.28” The court further
asserted that the once the Defendant conceptualized the intent to steal, any authority to
remain within the store was withdrawn.29
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The Issue at Bar
When comparing the Bradford case to the McDaniel case, it is important to note
that the Bradford decision largely came without judicial precedence—previous court
decisions had not interpreted the burglary statute to encompass what was previously
defined as a retail theft. The shocking factor within such a decision is not only that an
individual would be convicted of burglary for taking items worth less than what would
qualify as grand theft, but the charge of burglary necessitates a sentence that can range
from three to seven years in length (probation is technically possible in some
circumstances but, even if imposed, the defendant would still have a lifelong felony
conviction). This implication of such a conviction was a factor the McDaniel court
acknowledged when they affirmed the Circuit court’s decision to not convict the
defendant of burglary.
Given the different perspectives evidenced in the Bradford case and the McDaniel
case, questions about the legal system are sparked—if the man went before a different
judge, would the sentence have been different, or would a different legal perspective have
been used? Furthermore, what type of system do we have in place if a judge can
somewhat arbitrarily sentence an individual of a crime based on their perspective of
justice? In extrapolating the situations from the two cases and asking judges to determine
whether or not they would convict this individual and why, the impact of a judge’s
perspective can be evidenced. It is this perspective, and determining where such is
historically derived from, that perhaps jurisprudence can be monitored in a way that can
grant individuals equal weight in their opportunities to justice.
THE HYPOTHETICAL CASE
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Security cameras show a disheveled, middle-age man entering the Chicago KMart store on 18th Street during the prime hours of the work day. Skeptical eyes survey
him as he walks down the isles until he stops. Though the children’s aisle is small, it
appears that he knows where he is going – to the shoes, children’s shoes. Cameras focus
on him cautiously unfolding what is later confirmed to be a K-Mart bag. He picks up the
pink, light-up shoes and puts them in the bag and back into the left pocket of his jacket.
Michael Guevara was caught an hour later by the Chicago Police Department with
witnesses confirming that this was the man seen in the K-Mart store.
Upon review of his criminal file, it was found that Guevara was convicted of
driving under the influence in 2000 when he was twenty-two years old. Eleven years
later, he was convicted of possessing cannabis, for which he served 12 months of
probation. He then failed his probationary year for a retail theft ordinance violation and
for not paying fines. No other significant findings were found within the file; however,
given the witnesses, the surveillance video and previous history, the prosecutor decided
to charge Mr. Guevera with burglary, a class 2 felony. It is important to note: the
repercussions a felony can have on one’s record include the following: loss of the right to
(1) become an elector, (2) hold/run for public office, (3) perform jury duty, (4) legally
own a firearm; and (4) have a professional license.30
PROCEDURE
To begin this study, a list of all the circuit judges in the State of Illinois was
compiled and approximately fifty judges were randomly selected through an online
generator as the study pool A hypothetical situation was then drafted that incorporated
30
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the facts of the hypothetical case examined in the previous section. Based on the
conflicting rulings of the Bradford and McDaniels cases, there are disputable points
regarding the application of convicting the offender of burglary under a statutory
definition of a crime. After reviewing the fact pattern, the judges were then questioned as
to whether or not s/he would convict the defendant of burglary. Following the fact
pattern and the questions regarding the judge’s subsequent decision, a brief background
survey was attached which addressed the personal qualities of the judges (i.e. gender,
experience, age, relationship status, etc.). The documents were then mailed to the
randomly selected judges with directions and a self-addressed, postage-paid envelope for
the documents to be returned. A three-week period was allotted for the judges to return
the documents.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The amount of responses received were approximately 18% of the total amount of
individuals contacted, correlating with the expected response rate for a random external
survey (on average random external surveys have a response rate of 10-15%31). The
portion of individuals who responded to the survey were mostly white men, excluding
two women and one Hispanic male, with variances in age and experience as a judge. As
indicated in the surveys, the ages of the judges fell within two groups: (1) between 41 and
60 years of age, and (2) between 61 and 80 years of age. More variance was present
within the amount of judicial experience reported, for the levels of judicial experience
were recorded as existing between the following spans of years: 0-5 years, 6-10 years,
11-15 years, 16-20 years, and 26-30 years. All of the responding individuals were
31
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married, and almost all had children, save one individual. The population sizes of the
towns the survey pool was raised in did not appear to correlate with the decision the
judges made, as shown in the chart below.

Response Rates

0.25

Population Size and Verdict

0.20
1,001-10,000 (Not
Guilty)
1,001-10,000 (Guilty)

0.15
0.10

10,001-50,000 (Not
Guilty)
10,001-50,000 (Guilty)

0.05
0.00

50,001-150,000 (Not
Guilty)
50,001-150,000
(Guilty)
N/A

Figure 1: As shown, there is no true correlation between the population size and the verdict in the matter.

Nevertheless, a correlation appeared between the age of the judge and the
decision made—the younger judges in the age range of 40 to 60 years were more likely to
convict the Defendant of burglary than the older judges in the age range of 61 to 80 years
of age:
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Rela)on of Age to Verdict
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30

Guilty

0.20

Not Guilty

0.10
0.00
41yrs-60yrs
Age Range

61yrs-80yrs

Figure 2: Within the figure above, the correlation between verdict and age is displayed. (Note, however, the
outlier response from a judge who did not choose a verdict is not included.)

Similar to the correlation between the ages of the judges and their subsequent
verdicts, a correlation existed between the amount (in years) of job experience of the
judges and the verdict they chose. The correlation was almost similar in that the more
years of experience a judge had, the more likely the judge was going to determine the
Defendant not guilty. The correlation is depicted in the chart below:

Relation of Experience to Verdict
0.40

0.35
0.30

Not Guilty

0.25

Guilty

0.20

0.15
0.10
0.05

0.00
26yrs-30yrs 21yrs-25yrs 16yrs20yrs 11yrs-15yrs 6yrs-10yrs

0yrs-5yrs

Figure 3: Within the figure above, the correlation between judicial experience and verdict is displayed. (Note,
however, the outlier response from a judge who did not choose a verdict is not included.)
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As the guilty/non-guilty determination seemed to correlate with the age and
experience of the judges, the rationale processes accompanying the verdict seemed to
correlate as well with these characteristics. The written responses that affirmed the guilt
of the hypothetical perpetrator appeared to be laden with more reasoning than the
responses of those who denied that the perpetrator was guilty of burglary. The longer
length of reasoning within those that convicted Guevara with burglary did not necessarily
mean their arguments were more thorough in the analysis of the fact pattern. In fact, the
reasoning appeared to be more indicative of an illogical justification than a description of
rationale.
When interpreting the analysis of the judges, regardless if they deemed Guevara
guilty or not-guilty, the rules of law—though not the only factors when passing
judgment—are important to note and are displayed in the chart below with the
corresponding sentence:

RETAIL
THEFT
(CLASS A

720 ILCS
5/16-25(a)(1)

MISDEMEANOR)

SENTENCING

BURGLARY
(CLASS 2
FELONY)

SENTENCING

730 ILCS 5/54.5-55(a)
720 ILCS
5/19-1(a)

730 ILCS 5/54.5-35(a)

A person commits retail theft when he or she knowingly:
takes possession of, carries away, transfers or causes to be
carried away or transferred any merchandise displayed, held,
stored or offered for sale in a retail mercantile establish with
the intention of retaining such merchandise or with the
intention of depriving the merchant permanently of the
possession, use or benefit of such merchandise without paying
the full retail value of such merchandise.
For a Class A Misdemeanor: the sentence of imprisonment
shall be a determinate sentence of less than one year.
A person commits burglary when without authority he or she
knowingly enters or without authority remains within a
building, housetrailer, watercraft, aircraft, motor vehicle,
railroad car, or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein
a felony or theft.
For a Class 2 felony: The sentence of imprisonment shall be a
determinate sentence of not less than 3 years and not more
than 7 years.

All of the judges who convicted Guevara stated that, as the Bradford court
determined, the actions he committed fall into the legal definition of a burglary; some
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examples of the rationale include that “the fact pattern is technically a burglary, and the
state can charge it as a burglary” and “rules of law say he is guilty of burglary…his
conduct fits the burglary definition.” Though the judges state that Guevara committed
what they deem to technically have been a burglary, almost all of the judges had some
type of contradiction within their rationale. Their reasoning stated that: “I have never
seen a prosecutor charge it in such a case…I might think the charge is overkill” and that
it is “closer to retail theft than burglary.” Within these assertions, there is a stretch of
judgment—as there was within the Bradford case. In Bradford, the definitions of entry
and authority were weighed against residential burglaries—burglary matters in private
premises, instead of those in public premises:
“We find further support for our conclusion in People v. Dillavou, 2011 IL App (2d)
091194, 958 N.E.2d 1118. In Dillavou, the defendant was convicted of residential
burglary for stealing a camera from inside a house where he was performing work. The
Second District Appellate Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the residential
burglary statute requires proof that a defendant’s authority to be in the home of another
person was expressly withdrawn before he may be convicted of residential burglary by
unlawfully remaining. Id. ¶ 16, 958 N.E.2d 1118. The court noted the clear and
unambiguous language of the residential burglary statute indicated a defendant is guilty
of residential burglary if, while inside a house in which he has the authority to be, he
forms the intent to commit a theft therein. Id. ¶ 12, 958 N.E.2d 1118. Thus, according to
the court in Dillavou, a defendant’s authority to be in another person’s home “is
implicitly withdrawn when the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime.” (Emphasis
in original.) Id. ¶ 16, 958 N.E.2d 1118. ¶ 30 Burglary is a lesser-included offense of
residential burglary (see 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 2010)). Extending the Dillavou
court’s analysis vis-à-vis the residential burglary statute to the burglary statute here, a
defendant’s authority to be in a public building is implicitly withdrawn once the
defendant develops an intent to commit a felony or theft. In other words, the authority to
remain in a public building, or any part of the public building, extends only to persons
who remain in the building for a purpose consistent with the reason the building is
open.32” (emphasis added)
However, the court duly noted that the Weaver court referenced in their rationale
utilizes a statement that undermines their entire conclusion “A criminal intent formulated
32

People v. Bradford at ¶ 29.

17

after a lawful entry will not satisfy the [burglary] statute.33” In both instances, judges
overseeing the matters depend on the text, on a portion of dikē’ for their rationale;
however, when the text is applied to the instance of the crime, an analytical eye finds
fault within the connection. In Bradford, the court relied largely on the “clear and
unambiguous language” of the residential burglary statute to bridge the ambiguity within
the burglary statute regarding the authority to enter a building.34 This text of the
unconnected, residential burglary statute seemingly overrides what was said in previous
cases, as in Weaver, about how intent does not change one’s status of entry.
Though there was a sense of unnamed doubt within their rationale, it is interesting
that the judges in both the Bradford case and the hypothetic continue to assert that the
defendants should be convicted with class 2 felonies. The question arises as to why a
judge would decide to convict someone with a felony, when they themselves admit that
such charge is “overkill”?
The textual ineffectual reasoning within the rationale of those convicting the
individual is shown—it is to the text that Guevara’s actions are compared to instead of
their context within society. Simply put, the focus is on a portion of the scales of justice
instead of the whole. As the outlier judge, whose rationale did not pose doubt as the
other’s did, stated: “carrying the plastic bags into the store and using them for no other
reason but to put the shoes in would indicate an intent to steal prior to entry;” hence, the
intent element was hypothetically met. The two elements of burglary ([1]an unauthorized
individual entering a store and [2] an individual committing theft with intent) were (what
they deem to be) fulfilled. The effect of such a conviction did not seem to be weighed
33
34
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against the impact such would have in society, against a family, even though the presence
of one was acknowledged--“stealing children’s shoes suggests acting out of perceived
need.” Though the charge would indeed be an overcharge, as three out of four of the
judge’s state, it seems as though said charge did not outweigh the ruling of the text. Why
does the authority of the text seemingly outweigh the context of an individual’s life?
Wouldn’t these judges have discretion to not convict the defendant of burglary—
particularly, when the application of the text itself is somewhat ambiguous?
This type of reasoning relies upon itself as a truth within itself—it is the text of
the law that becomes the fundamental truth to which situations are applied and judged. In
the case of the burglary matter, the individuals were not presumed innocent of burglary
outright. They, along with their actions, were taken separately and put into an equation—
the prongs of a test—within which the output would be the crime of burglary if the
actions were malleable into filling the criterion of such. The perspective these judges
used show that it is not feasible the text could be inapplicable or even vague in terms of
applying such to a situation. The irrationality of this perspective is shown in that
situations become the malleable ambiguity, the “x” factor, subject to change within an
equation.
Just as dikē’ was conceived for a purpose, for the means to which its mother—
themis—serves, society created laws to manage and aid society itself. However,
ineffectual textual reading of statutes has led to the value of adhering to the law not for
the sake upholding societal values but merely for the sake of upholding a black and white
reading of the law. Accordingly, punishment instead of rehabilitation becomes the
ultimate outcome of justice. Is it not better to undercharge an individual whose crime was

19

not to the degree of another’s—as “it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one
innocent suffer.35”?
One of the more poignant sentences within the rationale of a judge who convicted
Guevara that is in tune with this matter is: “The truth is, the case is overcharged and
should be a misdemeanor but that is not up to the court.” It is a tactic of prosecutors to
overcharge cases to incite individuals to give in to plea bargains that are more in tune
with the charge one should realistically be charged with.36 Regardless, even though a case
is “overcharged,” it is up to the discretion and professional opinion of the judge to discern
between the facts and decide beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is guilty of a
crime that is charged. The judge acknowledged that the facts of the matter align with the
textual definition of a burglary, but an element of doubt existed as to whether the text
aligned with the intent of the law. The callous application of applying the definition of
burglary in this hypothetical case is a perfect example of the problem of solely judging
cases based a superficial reading of the text without considering the purpose of the law.
As the McDaniel court noted:
“The State knows that [defendant] was truly ‘stealing’, rather than committing a burglary.
The defense acknowledged at trial that shoplifting was what [defendant] was doing. ***
In reality, the approach taken by the State in this prosecution, and in this appeal, will
serve to convert every retail theft into a burglary.
Ordinary burglary is a Class 2 felony punishable by three to seven years in prison.
720 ILCS 5/19-1 (West 2012) [sic]; 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2012) [sic]. Standard
retail theft of the type occurring in this case (theft not from the person, under $500) is a
Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to 364 days in jail. 720 ILCS 5/16-1(b)(1) (West
2012) [sic]; 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-55(a) (West 2012) [sic]. The difference in potential
penalties is severe. Whether or not it is good public policy to convert potentially all retail
theft prosecutions into more serious ones for burglary is a matter of speculation. Whether
good or bad though, that decision does not rest with the police, prosecutors, or even the
35

"Words of Justice." Words of Justice. Harvard Law School Library, n.d. Web. 18 Dec. 2015.
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36 "Why Prosecutors Overcharge." National Center for Due Process, 12 July 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
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courts of this state. The legislature defines what actions constitute a crime and how the
crime should be punished. People v. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140, 145 (1995). If the police and
prosecutors of Illinois believe that harsher penalties should be available to punish retail
theft, they should put the issue before the legislature and seek change in the laws through
legislative amendment. This [c]ourt should not assist the prosecution in creating a de
facto amendment to the criminal law by reading ‘remaining within’ so broadly that
common shoplifting becomes burglary.37”
The judges whose judicial decision was not to convict Guevara with burglary did
not have as much rationale besides that the fact pattern did not fit the charge. Most
interpreted the matter in that Guevara entered the store with authority. One judge, akin to
what was stated in the McDaniel case, stated that he has never seen a matter, similar to
Guevara’s, that had been charged in this way—implying the absurdity of such a charge in
said situation, and the implications it would cause on society if similar situations were
charged as felonies. In all, it is vague and unclear whether other factors, such as the
amount of the item that was taken, the authority, or intent, were subsequent factors in
their end decisions.
One judge in particular outlined the legal reasoning behind why he chose what he
did: he used the public as a backdrop within which to judge the case, stating that “the
public is invited to enter the store” and further that said “permission was not revoked.”
He used the context of society to judge Guevara’s place within society—following a
perspective like a Roman Era perspective to influence his decision, for it is from society
and for society where laws arise. Just as the McDaniel court posited, it is against the
backdrop of society that judicial decisions need to determined—the effect of these
decisions needs to be weighed on the greater scale of thesmos. The judge did not solely

37
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weigh Guevara’s decision against the text of the law that applied to the charge, but to the
greater picture that encompassed such.
The outlier response was the judge who essentially recused himself, stating that
he did not review cases within the scope of the research presented. Not only did said
judge take the time to send such response back, but the judge knowingly reported his lack
of knowledge toward the subject that would hypothetically be presided over in this
matter. The circuit judges were notably chosen at random— the areas of law they
regularly overheard was not a factor within the selection. Though their presiding areas of
law were not a question within the background survey, such would have been an
interesting point to include. When presiding over Guevara’s case, did any of the other
judges reflect upon their experience and use such within their determinations? The fact
that this judge recused himself is impactful because in the interests of the proper
administration of justice he morally determined that he was not suited to overhear the
matter. That is the moral perspective highlighted and juxtaposed to the text-dependent
perspective.
The correlation between age, experience, and the verdict of a judge seems to
signify differing types of thought between younger, less experienced judges, and those
judges who are superior in age and experience with the law. The facts that those who
were more likely to convict Guevara wanted to do so based on the text of the law and that
they were also younger, perhaps suggests change in the administration of education in
law schools. Another possibility for the noticeable correlation between age/experience
and verdict is that w with increasing experience and age, judges gain a wizened
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perspective composed of themis that extends beyond the words of the statute, beyond
dikē’.
70
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Figure 4: Within the figure above, the correlation between age, judicial experience and verdict is
displayed. (Note, however, the outlier response from a judge who did not choose a verdict is not
included.)

Does it take experience and age in the judicial perspective for judges to have a
more moral laden perspective? Does it take such perspective to understand the
shortcomings of relying only on text when determining the fate of someone against the
law? Though open ended questions, perhaps a larger sample size of a more isolated
portion (focusing only on judges who have had experience in criminal court) would bring
results more supportive of a definitive answer to such questions. If such were performed,
this data could be extrapolated into a perspective that could be used to aid “new” judges
from focusing too much on the text of the law (as indicated within this study) equalizing
opportunities of those who stand before judges, awaiting their judgment.
CONCLUSION
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In sum, the perspectives shown within the judicial rationale of the judges
hypothetically overseeing the case of Guevara displays the divide within the evolution of
legal thought. This divide is not only evident through the results collected, but also within
recent judicial decisions that display the textual-focused and moralistic dichotomy of
perspectives within legal thought. Through analyzing the history of law, it is evident that
the moral perspective in applying justice has, to some judges, become secondary to
adhering to the textual underpinnings of statutes.
The scales of justice that were once a union between dikē’ and themis, have
disintegrated into mutually exclusive pieces for some judges – with their sole focus on
the parts that compose dikē’. As the law became less focused on the end of improving the
individual and society, it became hyper-focused on these means by which the law is
carried out – text, punishments, and oversight. . In a matter of time, the means were
mistaken for the end for which law served, resulting in the textual-based reasoning
evidenced in the hypothetical conviction of Guevara and the actual conviction of the
Bradford Defendant.
An analysis of the textual-based logic displays outright contradiction to the
beginnings of law and the purpose for which law served. As displayed within the
hypothetical case and the Bradford case, a situation within this perspective becomes
something to be manipulated to fit into the rigid definitions of a statute. The context of
the situation, the backdrop of society, and the implications of a judgment do not hold
weight within the Bradford perspective. Within the McDaniel perspective, the moral
implication of the decision to convict or to not convict is evidenced, accompanied by a
critical analysis of the applicability of the burglary statute to the particular fact pattern.
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The results wrought from this study, accompanied by the conflicting judicial
decisions within Illinois, demand for a recalibration of the justice system in the form of
further study and analysis of the perspectives of jurisprudence, for it is truly within the
hands of judges that justice plays out as they are the dikaspoloi --‘handlers of dikē’. In
deconstructing the perspectives that have emerged historically within the field of law and
applying such to modern-day jurisprudence, perhaps the dichotomy that has emerged may
be bridged with a perspective that is more multi-faceted and empathetic to both
personhood and the public. The scales of justice can be reassembled yet again be held by
Dike for the purpose of Themis.
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